PERSONALITY RESEARCH, METHODS, AND THEORY
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If a modern-day Rip van Winkle had been asleep during the 40-year interval between 1949 and 1989, he would have been startled upon awakening by the amount of scientific progress that had occurred in genetics and medicine, space science, materials technology, computer science, and even in the cognitive, behavioral, and neurosciences. On the other hand, if he had been particularly interested in the most basic and fundamental problem in personality psychology—the structure of human personality traits—he would wonder why it had taken 40 years to begin to develop a scientific consensus about an appropriate taxonomic model. In this chapter, I briefly describe some of the events leading to today's emerging consensus on a structural representation for phenotypic personality traits, highlighting the historical significance of Donald Fiske's (1949) seminal analyses. I then point out some of the obstacles to scientific agreement that occurred between the publication of Fiske's report and the present-day emerging consensus. The overall aim of this chapter is to provoke conjectures about those practices and procedures that could help ensure that future research on the "cutting edge" in personality psychology will not always take so tortuously long to be accepted.

THE BIG-FIVE FACTOR STRUCTURE

The search for a taxonomy of individual differences is an ancient one: Humans have continuously sought to make sense of the myriad characteristics they observe in others around them. However, until the present century, efforts to construct
taxonomic representations for human differences have relied on individual intuitions, such as those of Aristotle, who developed an early classification of human character traits. To develop a truly scientific model of individual differences, two fundamental problems had to be solved: (a) how to obtain a representative, if not comprehensive, set of such attributes; and (b) how to classify or categorize those attributes into a structural model. The first problem was solved by Sir Francis Galton, who may have been the first scientist to recognize explicitly the fundamental “lexical hypothesis” (viz., that the most important individual differences in human transactions will come to be encoded as single terms in some or all of the world’s languages). Moreover, Galton (1884) was certainly one of the first scientists to consult a dictionary as a means of estimating the number of personality-descriptive terms in the lexicon, and to appreciate the extent to which trait terms share aspects of their meanings. Galton’s estimate of the number of personality-related terms in English was later sharpened empirically, first by Allport and Odbert (1936), who culled such terms from the second edition of Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, and later by Norman (1967), who supplemented the earlier list with terms from the third edition. Galton’s insight concerning the relations among personality terms has been mirrored in efforts by later investigators to discover the nature of those relations, so as to construct a structural representation of personality descriptors.

What Galton lacked were the procedures for constructing such a taxonomic model. That problem was solved with the development of the broad class of statistical techniques referred to generically as factor analysis. Moreover, the father of factor analysis, L. L. Thurstone, became the first scientist to use lexical materials to test his new technique; he administered 60 common trait adjectives to 1,300 subjects who used them to describe someone they knew well. Analyses of the correlations among the 60 terms across the 1,300 subjects revealed five broad factors, which led Thurstone (1934) to assert that “… the scientific description of personality may not be so hopelessly complex as it is sometimes thought to be” (p. 14).

Curiously, Thurstone never followed up on his initial analysis of personality-trait terms. Instead, the first scientist to devote systematic attention to the problem was Raymond B. Cattell, who began his personality explorations with a perusal of the approximately 4,500 trait-descriptive terms included in the Allport and Odbert compendium. Cattell (1943) used this trait list as a starting point, eventually developing a set of 35 highly complex bipolar variables, each pole of which included a composite set of adjectives and phrases. These variables were then employed in various studies, in each of which the correlations among the variables were factored using oblique rotational procedures (e.g., Cattell, 1947).

Cattell has repeatedly claimed to have identified at least a dozen oblique factors. However, when Cattell’s variables were later analyzed by others, only five factors proved to be replicable (e.g., Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Fiske, 1949; Norman, 1963; Smith, 1967; Tupes & Christal, 1961).
five-factor structures based on other sets of variables have been reported by a number of other investigators (e.g., Borgatta, 1964; Digman & Inouye, 1986; Goldberg, 1990, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1985a, 1987), and these studies have now been reviewed extensively (e.g., Digman, 1990; John, 1990; McCrae & John, 1992; Wiggins & Pincus, 1992; Wiggins & Trapnell, in press).

These “Big-Five” factors have traditionally been numbered and labeled: (I) Surgency (or Extraversion), (II) Agreeableness, (III) Conscientiousness, (IV) Emotional Stability (vs. Neuroticism), and (V) Culture. More recently, Factor V has been reinterpreted as Intellect (e.g., Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Peabody & Goldberg, 1989) and Openness to Experience (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1987).

Although there is some disagreement about the precise nature of these five domains, there is widespread agreement that some aspects of the language of personality description can be organized hierarchically (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1986). In such a representation, the Big-Five domains are located at the highest level that is still descriptive of behavior, with only general evaluation located at a higher and more abstract level (John, Hampson, & Goldberg, 1991). When thus viewed hierarchically, it should be clear that proponents of the five-factor model have never intended to reduce the rich tapestry of personality to a mere five traits. Rather, they seek to provide a scientifically compelling framework in which to organize the myriad individual differences that characterize humankind.

Indeed, these broad domains incorporate hundreds, if not thousands, of traits: Factor I (Surgency or Extraversion) contrasts traits such as Talkativeness, Assertiveness, and Activity Level with traits such as Silence, Passivity, and Reserve; Factor II (Agreeableness or Pleasantness) contrasts traits such as Kindness, Trust, and Warmth with traits such as Hostility, Selfishness, and Distrust; Factor III (Conscientiousness or Dependability) contrasts traits such as Organization, Thoroughness, and Reliability with traits such as Carelessness, Negligence, and Unreliability; Factor IV (Emotional Stability vs. Neuroticism) contrast traits such as Imperturbability and Calmness with traits such as Nervousness, Moodiness, and Temperamentality; and Factor V (Intellect or Openness to Experience) contrasts traits such as Imagination, Curiosity, and Creativity with traits such as Shalowness and Imperceptiveness.

As pointed out by Peabody and Goldberg (1989), the interpretation of Factor V as Culture arose from a historical accident: Although Cattell had initially constructed a subset of variables relating to Intellect, in the seminal studies of Cattell (1947) he omitted all those variables in favor of an intelligence test. In turn, this test was omitted from his later studies, leaving no direct representation of most Intellect variables. In their absence, Factor V was called Culture by Tupes and Christal (1961) and some later investigators. However, when variables related to Intellect were reintroduced (e.g., Goldberg, 1990), it became clear that Intellect was the more appropriate label for the fifth broad factor.
THE REMARKABLE CONTRIBUTION OF DONALD W. FISKE

Whereas Thurstone (1934) found the correct number of broad personality factors, his collection of 60 trait adjectives was too idiosyncratically assembled to have produced today’s Big-Five structure. Instead, the honor of first discovery must be accorded to Fiske (1949), who analyzed a set of 22 variables developed by Cattell, and found five factors that replicated across samples of self-ratings, observer ratings, and peer ratings. Fiske’s labels for his factors, like those proposed by subsequent investigators, can be viewed as never perfectly successful attempts to capture the prototypical content of these broad domains—Confident Self-Expression (Big-Five Factor I), Social Adaptability (Factor II), Conformity (Factor III), Emotional Control (Factor IV), and Inquiring Intellect (Factor V). Of these five labels, four could still be used today; only Conformity seems too narrow and undesirable to capture the many aspects of responsibility and dependability inherent in Big-Five Factor III (Conscientiousness).

In Fiske’s article, entitled “Consistency of the Factorial Structures of Personality Ratings from Different Sources,” he acknowledged the earlier contributions of Cattell (1947), and noted that no one had yet compared the factor structures obtained from different types of raters. He asked, “Do the factors in self-ratings bear any resemblance to the factors in ratings by peers? Are the factors from either of these sources comparable to those found in the ratings of trained clinicians?” (p. 329). To answer these questions, he analyzed the ratings of 128 men who were about to enter graduate schools in clinical psychology and who had attended one of the week-long assessment sessions held at the University of Michigan in the summer of 1947; the details of this Veterans Administration Selection Research Project are reported in the classic volume by Kelly and Fiske (1951). The subjects described themselves and were described by three peers and three members of the assessment staff with 42 variables, of which 22 had been adapted from the set developed by Cattell (1947); all ratings were made on 8-step scales. The self-ratings, median peer ratings, and the pooled staff ratings for the 22 Cattell variables were factored separately and then compared.

That sounds easy. Today it would be. However, 45 years ago, before the computer revolution, all analyses had to be carried out by hand calculator. With the help of his wife, Barbara, the Fiskes hand-calculated the correlations among the 22 variables, hand-extracted five centroid factors, hand-rotated those factors by Thurstone’s method of extended vectors, and then hand-calculated the transformation matrices between the unrotated and rotated factors, as well as the correlations among the rotated factors. Moreover, they did all this three times—once for each of the three data sources. Finally, to compare the three solutions, they hand-correlated the rotated factor loadings from each data source with the loadings from the other two sources.

Fiske called the five factors he discovered recurrent factors to emphasize their similarity across the three data sources. He then compared his own five recurrent
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factors with the much larger number reported by Cattell, and expressed his feelings about the correspondence between the two solutions: “A thorough study of these two sets of factors, one from Cattell and one from our ratings by teammates, leaves one with feelings of both optimism and discouragement. Even in the face of no complete congruence, the similarities support a belief in the possibility of eventual agreement upon the basic variables in personality” (p. 341). Note the similarity between that last sentence and the one quoted earlier from Thurstone (1934), who also obtained five personality factors.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE DECADE OF THE 1960s

Before 1950, then, at least two separate five-factor models of phenotypic personality traits had appeared in the scientific literature—both with roots in the lexicographic tradition, but each using a different set of trait-descriptive variables. Fiske (1949) did not cite Thurstone (1934), although he did cite Thurstone’s textbook on multiple-factor analysis. Cattell (1947), who also did not cite Thurstone, reported the findings from analyses of his 35 variables, soon followed by additional analyses of the same or similar variables in other samples. In each of his analyses, Cattell extracted and rotated at least 12 factors. Noting that many of Cattell’s factors were identified on the basis of quite low loadings, Fiske commented that he “... does not share this confidence in the significance of low loadings” (p. 342). History has proved the wisdom of Fiske’s observation: Cattell’s factors have proved notoriously difficult to replicate.

Among the many who tried and failed were Tupes and Christal (1958, 1961), who analyzed a variety of datasets, including those collected by Fiske, Cattell, and themselves. All of the datasets included sets of variables from Cattell, and were based on either peer or observer ratings. Using across-sample replicability as a criterion for deciding on the number of factors, Tupes and Christal (1961) discovered five robust factors, which they labeled Surgency (Factor I), Agreeableness (Factor II), Dependability (Factor III), Emotional Stability (Factor IV), and Culture (Factor V). Their classic 1961 Air Force technical report has now been reprinted (Tupes & Christal, 1992), along with an appreciative editorial by McCrae (1992) and a historical introduction by Christal (1992).

Norman (1963), Borgatta (1964), and Smith (1967, 1969) all reacted to the work of Tupes and Christal (1958, 1961) with their own independent studies, and found much the same five-factor structure. Of these reports, Norman’s article has been historically the most important, both because of his carefullness in analysis and reporting and because it was published in a highly visible and prestigious journal. Norman selected the four variables from the Tupes and Christal (1961) analyses that loaded most highly on each of the five factors, and then collected peer ratings with those 20 variables in four new samples. He found such substantial factor replicability across the samples that his five-factor solution has often been incorrectly cited as the “Norman Five.”
Borgatta used other variables in separate analyses of male and female samples and found five replicated factors, which he labeled *Assertiveness* (I), *Likability* (II), *Responsibility* (III), *Emotionality* (IV), and *Intelligence* (V). Using composite scores on each of the five factors, he compared self-ratings, self-rankings, and peer rankings (the latter two in samples composed of close friends, as well as in samples of acquaintances) in a multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) design (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Using the variables of Cattell (1947), Smith (1967) compared the structures derived from three large samples (*N* = 583, 521, and 324) and found five robust factors, which he labeled *Extraversion* (I), *Agreeableness* (II), *Strength of Character* (III), *Emotionality* (IV), and *Refinement* (V). Moreover, Smith found that scores derived from the *Character* (III) factor correlated .43 with college grades. In a later peer-nomination study, Smith (1969) recovered the four factors other than *Refinement* in male and female samples at both the junior high school and high school levels. Moreover, he found high correlations with smoking status, smoking being negatively related to Factors II (*Agreeableness*) and III (*Strength of Character*), and positively related to Factor I (*Extraversion*).

**TIME OUT: THE 1970s**

By 1970, then, one might have assumed that the five-factor model had amassed more than enough evidence to ensure its viability as the taxonomic framework for phenotypic personality traits. But it was not to be. Other forces dominated this decade, unleashed by a Zeitgeist that eschewed the very concept of personality traits, if not of personality itself (e.g., Mischel, 1968). The 1970s witnessed the virtual abandonment of major segments of personality research, including the investigation of personality-trait structure.

**THE RENAISSANCE: THE 1980s**

In the spring of 1978, John Digman was to teach a course in factor analysis, for which he obtained a number of correlation matrices from classic studies of abilities and personality traits, including those previously analyzed by Tupes and Christal (1961) and Norman (1963). Before providing them to his students for reanalysis, however, he checked them carefully and found clerical errors in the matrices of two of Cattell's studies. More importantly, he discovered that when six or more factors were rotated from the various matrices, the factors did not correspond; whereas when five factors were rotated, there was striking interstudy correspondence (Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981). Later research by Digman and Inouye (1986) again obtained the Big-Five factors in teachers' ratings of the children in their classrooms. This same period saw the publication of two of my
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chapters (Goldberg, 1981, 1982), both stimulated by the lexical hypothesis. The first provided some conjectures about the possible universality of the Big-Five factor structure, and the second described a program of research focusing on English trait-descriptive adjectives and nouns.

The 1980s witnessed the emergence of the two dominant variants of the five-factor model, one developed by McCrae and Costa (1985a, 1987) and operationalized in the Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Personality Inventory (NEO-PI; Costa & McCrae, 1985), and the other associated with studies based on the lexical hypothesis and operationalized in the sets of factor markers provided by Norman (1963), Peabody and Goldberg (1989), Goldberg (1990, 1992), John (1989), Trapnell and Wiggins (1990), and Digman and his associates (e.g., Digman, 1989; Digman & Inouye, 1986). Much is the same in both variants: (a) the number of dimensions is identical, namely five; (b) the content of Factor IV is essentially the same, although it is oriented in the opposite direction in the two models, and is thus so labeled (Emotional Stability vs. Neuroticism); and (c) there is considerable similarity, although not identity, in the content of Factor III (Conscientiousness). On the other hand, at least two of the differences between the variants are quite striking: (a) the locations of Factors I and II are systematically rotated, such that Warmth is a facet of Extraversion in the NEO-PI, whereas it is a facet of Agreeableness in the lexical model; and (b) Factor V is conceived as Openness to Experience in the NEO-PI and as Intellect or Imagination in the lexical model.

These differences stem from the history of the NEO-PI, which started out as a questionnaire measure of a three-factor model, including only Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness to Experience. Whereas other three-factor theorists such as Eysenck (1991) have stood firm as proponents of their original representations, Costa and McCrae reacted to the events of the early 1980s with such remarkable Openness to Experience that, by the end of the decade, these investigators had become the world’s most prolific and influential proponents of the five-factor model. The prodigious outpouring of reports by McCrae and Costa probably did more to form the modern consensus about personality structure than anything else that occurred during the 1980s. Specifically, they used the NEO-PI scales as a framework for integrating a wide variety of other questionnaire scales, including those developed by Eysenck (McCrae & Costa, 1985b), Jackson (Costa & McCrae, 1988a), Spielberger (Costa & McCrae, 1987), and Wiggins (McCrae & Costa, 1989b), as well as the scales included in the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Costa, Busch, Zonderman, & McCrae, 1986) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (McCrae & Costa, 1989a).

Actually, the trait descriptor Warm has been classified in facet II/II+ in some AB5C (Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992) analyses in the lexical model, whereas Warmth is considered a I+/II+ facet in the McCrae and Costa model, suggesting more agreement when both primary and secondary loadings are considered than when one considers the primary loadings alone.
THE MINORITY REPORTS: PRESENT-DAY OPPONENTS AND CRITICS

An emerging consensus is not the same as universal agreement: There are those who do not accept the Big-Five factor structure. Indeed, the two most famous holdouts, Cattell and Eysenck, share little but their opposition to the five-factor model. Cattell remains convinced that there are far more factors than five, whereas Eysenck is certain that five is too many. Specifically, Eysenck (1991, 1992) has argued that Factors II (Agreeableness) and III (Conscientiousness) in the Big-Five representation are merely facets of the higher level construct of Psychoticism in his Psychoticism-Extraversion-Neuroticism (P-E-N) model.

SO WHY DID IT TAKE SO LONG?

Despite the critics, any alert reader of the primary literature in personality psychology would be struck by the extent to which the Big-Five factor structure has gained recognition and grudging acceptance as the major representation of phenotypic personality traits. Moreover, this framework has begun to win converts in industrial/organizational contexts. Indeed, both qualitative (e.g., Schmidt & Ones, 1992) and quantitative (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991) reviews of the literature have concluded that personality measures, when classified within the Big-Five domains, are systematically related to a variety of criteria of job performance. If it is fair to say that the five-factor model is now generally seen as the most useful organization of personality traits (e.g., Digman, 1990), then it is reasonable to ask, what took it so long to be accepted? What forces kept the field fractionated for all those years? In the remainder of this chapter, I briefly outline some of the pressures against consensus that characterized the history of personality psychology in the years since Fiske (1949). My hope is that, by understanding these pressures, we can mitigate delays in the acceptance of future models and procedures, thus allowing the field to proceed on its scientific course more expeditiously.

Doing It All by Hand

Certainly one of the forces that worked against early replications of the five-factor model was the sheer difficulty of the calculations prior to the widespread availability of reasonably efficient computers and standardized computer programs. From Thurstone (1934) through Fiske (1949) to Tupes and Christal (1961), factor analyses were carried out by hand, which virtually guaranteed the possibility of some clerical errors, as Digman and Takemoto-Chock (1981) discovered when they reanalyzed some of the datasets provided by Cattell. Tupes and Christal included the findings from one computer analysis in their report,
and were able to show its comparability with their painstaking hand-calculations. However, by the time of Norman (1963), computers were here to stay, and today this problem has all but disappeared.

**Lock of Follow-Up**

Had Thurstone (1934) more fully embraced the lexical hypothesis and realized the significance of his initial discovery, the history of the Big-Five model might have been quite different. But Thurstone devoted himself to other scientific pursuits, as did Fiske, Borgatta, and Smith. Seemingly, these investigators did not realize the importance of their discoveries. Why? Here are some speculative possibilities.

**Doing Our Own Things**

The field of personality psychology has faced continued difficulties in establishing a cumulative scientific record. Perhaps because of the academic reward system, personality psychologists tend to function more like a motley array of superstars than like a smooth-functioning team. Each of us has our own agenda, and integration is not our long suit. Indeed, we do not even agree about the most important scientific questions, much less the answers. We esteem our own contributions, and we are quick to pick holes in the contributions of others. Each of us seems to live by the motto, If I didn’t do it, it wasn’t done right.

One result of this egocentric bias has been the proliferation of taxonomic models. Very rarely does the developer of a model admit that a rival model is superior. As a consequence, we engage in wars of attrition: Models disappear only when their originators fade away. Those who are not involved in research on the structure of individual differences are justifiably bewildered by the diversity of our competing models and the vitriol of our arguments in favor of our own contributions. Whom are they to believe?

For we are better critics than integrators, better at finding holes than patching them. One could argue that the gradual acceptance of the Big-Five model grew out of our continued attempts to replace it with something more attractive, all of which failed. For example, Norman, whose 1963 article is the single-most cited reference to the Big-Five structure, spent much of his early research career as a skeptic. Paradoxically, although his importance in the history of the five-factor model is universally acknowledged, his refusal to become a true believer has typically been overlooked. Yet after his seminal studies confirming the five-factor model with a selected set of Cattell variables (Norman, 1963), he instituted an extensive research program aimed at replacing that model with a more comprehensive one. He began by expanding the corpus of English personality terms assembled by Allport and Odbert (1936), then classifying the terms in the expanded pool into such categories as *states*, *traits*, and *roles*, and finally collecting normative information about some 2,800 trait-descriptive terms
(Norman, 1967). Norman was convinced that, because of the inevitable computational and other technical limitations of research in the 1930s and 1940s, Cattell’s variables left much to be desired, and therefore studies utilizing a representative subset of the total English personality-trait lexicon would uncover some broad dimensions beyond the Big-Five structure. Although Norman never tested this appealing conjecture, others did (e.g., Goldberg, 1990), and it has proved to be wrong.

**Failure to See the Forest From the Trees**

Digman espoused a 10-factor model of child personality structure as late as 1977, and Cattell still espouses an even more complex representation. Both investigators followed a “bottom-up” strategy for constructing a hierarchical model, using oblique rotations to obtain correlated factors, which in turn could then be analyzed obliquely at successively higher levels. In contrast, investigators such as Tupes and Christal (1961), Norman (1963), and Goldberg (1990, 1992) followed a “top-down” strategy, using orthogonal rotations so as to first establish the overall dimensionality of their variable sets, and only later attempting to discover the facets within each broad factor domain (Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992). By analogy, the former strategy builds up the forest on a tree-by-tree basis, whereas the latter strategy first locates the outlines of the forest and then focuses on the individual trees. Using a geographical analogy, the former strategy first finds such distinctive features of the landscape as lakes, rivers, and mountain ranges, which in turn are used to discover the continents, whereas the latter strategy first locates the continents and later maps their distinctive features. Which is the best way to proceed?

If the history of the five-factor model is to be one’s guide, one should place one’s bets on the top-down strategy. As Digman (1990) noted, when factors are rotated obliquely to a simple-structure criterion, they are likely to be associated with relatively homogeneous clusters of variables, rather than the basic dimensions of the multivariate space. Whereas it is possible that the two strategies could converge on a common representation, this would be most unlikely unless the initial selection of variables had been carried out with extraordinary prescience. That is, to select the initial variables so thoughtfully requires knowledge of the number of overall factor domains and the nature of the facets located within each domain. One is not likely to know all this in advance.

**Failure to Separate Signal From Noise**

As early as 1961, Tupes and Christal called attention to the difficulties involved in deciding when two structural representations were the same and when they truly differed. In discussing their own finding that five factors replicated across the diverse datasets that they analyzed, they commented:
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In many ways it seems remarkable that such stability should be found in an area which to date has granted anything but consistent results. Undoubtedly the consistency has always been there, but it has been hidden by inconsistency of factorial techniques and philosophies, the lack of replication using identical variables, and disagreement among analysts as to factor titles. None of the factors identified in this study are new. They have been identified many times in previous analyses, although they have not always been called by the same names. (Tupes & Christal, 1961, p. 12)

Little did those investigators realize that it would take yet another 25 years for the field to separate the Big-Five signal from the noise of alternative factor representations. Inconsistency of factorial techniques and philosophies have remained, and have increased over time. On the other hand, the widespread availability of computer programs for conducting a standard analysis (such as principal components rotated by varimax) has served to decrease the use of idiosyncratic procedures. In any case, we now know that most reservations about the fragility of factor solutions are unfounded, provided that the datasets include substantial numbers of variables and samples of large size. For example, Goldberg (1990) demonstrated the virtual identity of Big-Five factor loadings across 10 factorial procedures, including both factor and component analyses, and both orthogonal and oblique rotational algorithms.

A second problem identified by Tupes and Christal (1961) was a lack of replications using identical variables. Indeed, it has proved to be extremely difficult to cumulate conclusions from single-shot studies with unique sets of variables. In the history of the Big-Five factor structure, the studies that have proved to be most persuasive to critics of the model were those that compared the factor structures from similar sets of variables across diverse samples or procedures (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1988b; Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Fiske, 1949; Goldberg, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Norman, 1963; Tupes & Christal, 1961).

The final problem identified by Tupes and Christal was that of disagreement among analysts as to factor titles. Everyone seems to have a favorite label, especially for the Big-Five factors, which are clearly too broad to be captured well by any single trait-descriptive term. Critics of the model are quick to note the discord among investigators in their factor labels, and to attribute such differences in labels to fundamental differences in the underlying factor structures. However, most of the differences in labels result from individual styles or tastes (e.g., Conscientiousness vs. Will for Factor III). One difference in labels does reflect a somewhat different conception of the underlying factor: Factor V is labeled as Openness to Experience in the McCrae and Costa variant of the five-factor model, and as Intellect in the lexical variant. Actually, as suggested by Saucier (1992), neither Openness nor Intellect captures well the central cluster of traits that define Factor V. Perhaps a more apt label is Imagination for a domain including such traits as Creativity and Curiosity.
A Malignant Zeitgeist

In 1961, Tupes and Christal had no way of knowing that the 1970s would witness a virtual moratorium on the investigation of many fundamental problems in personality psychology, including the search for a compelling taxonomy of personality traits. However, the 1970s turned out to be a decade of controversy about the scientific status of traits in general and broad traits in particular, stimulated by such critics as D'Andrade (1965), Mischel (1968), and Shweder (1975). Many of the issues involved in this controversy may have now been resolved (e.g., Borkenau, 1992; Funder, 1991), with optimistic implications for the eventual transformation of personality psychology into a more cumulative scientific enterprise.

CODA

Fiske was much involved in the controversies of the 1970s, and he was profoundly influenced by the behavioristic Zeitgeist that was sweeping the field at that time. Perhaps as a reaction to the “nattering nabobs of negativism” who were pummeling personality psychology, he lost interest in broad personality traits (e.g., Fiske, 1973, 1974), and began to argue in favor of more behavioral units of analysis, so as to ensure high levels of interjudge agreement on the basic elements of personality. Moreover, he began to feel quite pessimistic about the likelihood of ever reaching agreement on a taxonomy of personality traits, with the result that he did not further pursue his seminal study of trait factor structures. Today, Fiske is renowned for his methodological and philosophical contributions to the field of personality. Wouldn’t it be ironic if historians of the future also judged his 1949 empirical study as being of such signal importance that it served as a verification of his earlier “belief in the possibility of eventual agreement upon the basic variables of personality” (Fiske, 1949, p. 341)? If so, he has the right to ask, What the hell took so long?

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